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Abstract
The simulation technique provides a new means for analysing complex
interdependencies in payment and securities settlement processing. The Bank of
Finland has developed a payment and settlement system simulator (BoF-PSS2)
that can be used for constructing simulation models of payment and securities
settlement systems.
This paper describes the main elements of payment and settlement systems
(system structures, interdependencies, processing steps, liquidity consumption,
cost and risk dimensions) and how these can be treated in simulation studies. It
gives also examples on how these elements have been incorporated in the
simulator, as well as an overview of the structure and the features of the BoF-
PSS2 simulator.





Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 23/2003
Harry Leinonen – Kimmo Soramäki
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Simulointitekniikka tarjoaa uuden tavan tutkia maksu- ja selvitysjärjestelmien
monimuotoisia riippuvuuksia. Suomen Pankki on kehittänyt maksu- ja selvitys-
järjestelmäsimulaattorin (BoF-PSS2), jota voidaan käyttää rakennettaessa simu-
lointimalleja maksu- ja selvitysjärjestelmistä.
Tässä tutkimuksessa kuvataan maksu- ja selvitysjärjestelmien pääelementtejä
(rakenteet, riippuvuudet, käsittelyvaiheet, likviditeetin käyttö sekä kustannus- ja
riskitekijät) sekä miten nämä voidaan sisällyttää simulointitutkimuksiin. Työssä
on myös esimerkkejä siitä, miten nämä elementit on toteutettu simulaattorissa ja
kuvaus simulaattorin rakenteesta ja piirteistä.
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1 Introduction
Interbank payment and securities settlement mechanisms are the main facilities
for transferring monetary claims and assets between financial institutions. These
systems transfer many times the value transferred by cash instruments or retail
payments.
The infrastructure has gradually grown into a complicated interactive network
of systems that transfer claims and assets at the domestic and international level.
Integration of these systems has resulted in critical interdependencies. The
configurations found around the world have evolved to address local needs,
customs and process organisation patterns. Technical solutions depend on when
the systems were implemented. This has resulted in a wide variety of
configurations; some configurations and system features are better suited to
processing specific transaction flows. Suitability and efficiency can be assessed
against objectives defined for financial systems, which also vary over time and
region. Typical system design objectives include low counterparty risk, quick
throughput, low liquidity consumption and low settlement costs.
1
The characteristics of different payment and securities settlement systems are
difficult to analyse with traditional econometric tools and econometric models are
often too general to describe systems at the level of detail needed to capture
differences arising from various design parameters.
Simulations, on the other hand, provide the possibility to get closer to reality
and make detailed analysis. Simulations can use actual production transaction
flows and exactly mimic the specific features of each system, and thereby give
more precise and policy-relevant results for the specific environment of interest.
They can also be used to provide empirical data on rare events (such as bank
failures) or imagined system designs and structures. Simulations, of course, have
limitations in optimisation analysis. Generally, only a ‘what if’ type of
enumeration is possible, which always leaves the possibility for undiscovered
better solutions.
The aim of this paper is to describe:
– general elements present in payment and securities settlement systems,
– the most interesting aspects of analysis with these systems, and
– possibilities to use simulations to study these dimensions.
This paper serves also a background document for new version of the Bank of
Finland Payment and securities settlement Simulator (BoF-PSS2). In presenting
                                                
1 For information and studies on different arrangements see Borio-Russo-Van den Bergh (1992),
BIS (1990 and 1997), and ECB (2001).8
the general elements found in payment and securities settlement systems, it
simultaneously describes in general terms the structure and features of the
simulator. An overall description of the simulator can be found in appendix 1.
Detailed documentation is posted at www.bof.fi/sc/bof-pss. The simulator is
freely available for central banks and research institutions.
The paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents the general features and
structures found in payment and settlement systems. Chapter 3 describes the
interdependencies between and within systems. In chapter 4 the payment and
settlement process is discussed. Chapter 5 describes the cost and liquidity aspects
of settlement systems.
2 General features of payment and securities
settlement systems
Payment and settlement systems can be categorised according to the transaction
types they process, ie customer transfers (payment systems), interbank settlement
transfers (settlement systems) or a combination of both. Payment systems process
different types of transfers (credit transfers, direct debits, checks, etc) between
customer accounts. Pure settlement systems are used solely for interbank
settlements and no end-customer information is conveyed. Interbank claims
usually originate from payment systems and securities settlement systems
representing settlement for batches of individual payments. In a mixed system,
customer payments and interbank settlements are processed in parallel.
Securities settlement systems process customer transfers of securities, mainly
in book-entry format. While payment and securities settlement systems today are
clearly separated, the technical process for transfers related to monetary
currencies and book-entry securities are essentially the same. In both types of
systems, accounts representing funds or securities are credited and debited.
Payment systems may also be categorised as retail or large-value payment
systems. This distinction has been important because of the different risks
involved and (at least in the past) differences in service speed and efficiency.
Most retail payment systems are currently settled on a net basis using very simple
algorithms. In these systems, the liquidity impact and settlement risks are
generally low and therefore no sophisticated liquidity and risk management tools
are warranted. The opposite is true for large-value payment systems, which often
contain sophisticated risk and liquidity management features.
The traditional approach to processing payments was end-of-day net batch
processing, whereby payments were collected by the banks in daily batches and
handed over to payment systems that cleared them over the following days.
Interbank settlement for such payments typically took one to three days. Today,9
batch systems operate with settlement cycles as short as every 30 minutes. Such
systems are called deferred net settlement systems (DNS).
Thanks to real-time processing capabilities, payments can now be processed
individually and immediately. Real-time processing is mainly used for large-value
transfers; the bulk of retail payments are still made in deferred batches. Real-time
processing should gradually expand to all kinds of payments in response to
customer service requirements and the growth of e-commerce. Real-time payment
systems fall into two groups: the real-time gross settlement systems (RTGS) of
central banks and private continuous net settlement systems (CNS). Interbank
settlement transfers in RTGS systems are directly booked on central bank
accounts, ie payments and settlements are processed simultaneously. In CNS
systems, payments are booked immediately, while final settlement, eg with central
bank money, is typically delayed until the end of the day.
In true real-time processing, the liquidity need is fixed by the processed
payment flow so it cannot be influenced. In fact, the liquidity need can be
smoothed by deferring payments (eg queuing) and by netting queued payments
between banks with opposing queued payment flows. This situation also gives the
possibility to save interbank settlement liquidity when all payments do not require
immediate processing. This has resulted in the emergence of a third group of
systems, hybrid systems, which combine features from real-time and deferred net
settlement systems. Most large-value payment systems currently operated by
central banks are RTGS systems, but they continually acquire an increasing
number of hybrid features for preserving liquidity, optimising the use of liquidity
and resolution of gridlock situations.
Gross-based real-time processing is the stated goal of securities processing
systems. In most cases, however, such systems actually only deliver a type of
deferred real-time processing, which takes place several days after the securities
trade was agreed. Thus, the transaction processing of securities settlement systems
is typically T+3, although T+5 systems can even be found. Given that securities
settlement systems involve so much risk, the current trend is to move from
deferred net settlement to deferred real-time settlement. Internationally, the yet-to-
be-achieved objective has for some years been to move to T+1 real-time
settlement. Limiting risks, increasing settlement speed and removing barriers for
efficient cross-border transfers have been very topical issues regarding securities
settlement systems.
2 Securities settlement should eventually move to true real-
time T+0 processing (ie settlement immediately when the deal is made).
3 Indeed,
a true real-time system can already be found in the Czech Republic.
4 Some
                                                
2 See BIS (1995), EU Commission (2001, 2002 and 2003) and Group of Thirty (2003).
3 See Leinonen (2003).
4 See ECB (2002).10
systems also permit securities lending in real-time, which can be seen as the
beginning of an expanded approach to real-time processing.
Systems may also be categorised as public or private systems depending on
the settlement institution. The settlement institution is the institution across whose
books transfers between participants take place to achieve settlement within the
settlement system (BIS 2001). In most cases, the central bank is the principal
settlement institution in domestic payment systems. The settlement asset in such
systems is central bank money, ie claims against the central bank. For large value
payments, the most common settlement asset is central bank money.
5
The settlement institution in a payment or securities settlement system can
also be a private entity such as a commercial bank or a financial institution
specifically created to act as a settlement institution (eg limited purpose bank). In
such systems, the settlement asset is commercial bank money, ie claims against
private financial institutions. These systems generally have an added risk as the
private settlement institution may go bankrupt. The bankruptcy risk of a central
bank, in comparison, is almost nonexistent. Reducing the amount of risks that the
settlement institution takes can reduce its probability of failure and the associated
risk.
Some countries have a two-tiered settlement hierarchy, whereby a small
number of large banks settle on the books of the central bank, while a large
number of small and intermediary banks settle with the facilities of the larger
banks. Savings and co-operative banks may also maintain an internal settlement
bank as an intra-group settlement institution and as the external gateway to other
banks or payment systems. A multi-tiered structure adds new risk and processing
layers. Modern technology supports flat network-based structures with direct ITC
contacts between all parties.
6
In securities settlement systems, central securities depositories (CSDs),
central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs), central banks and private banks can
function as settlement institutions. In international securities processing, in
particular, private settlement institutions currently play a major role.
The increasing flow of cross-border payments has resulted in a growing
demand for multi-currency processing and settlement possibilities. Until recently,
most international transfers were settled through the correspondent networks of
international banks. Today, there is a clear move towards international clearing
and settlement systems. There is also a distinct preference for central bank
settlement of systemically critical systems.
The finality of payments and settlement has become more important with
increasing cross-border payment flows over several jurisdictions. Customers and
                                                
5 See BIS (2003).
6 See Leinonen, Lumiala and Sarlin (2002).11
participants need clear rules defining when a transfer is final and irrevocable. The
Directive on settlement finality
7 has harmonised the EU legal rules on this issue.
The BoF-PSS2 simulator can be used to study the impact of many of the
developments in payment and settlement systems described above. The simulator
contains the basic features for RTGS, DNS and CNS processing. It can process
large transaction volumes (several million) and the number of participants can be
high (tens of thousands). A participant can further have several accounts that can
be used for identifying different currencies or types of book-entry securities.
3 Interdependencies in the payment and settlement
process
3.1 System hierarchy
Payment and settlement systems generally take on a hierarchical structure where
different types of transactions are handled in different systems. Obligations
arising from these systems are settled in interbank settlement systems. To reduce
the liquidity need, interbank settlement can be concentrated into one settlement
institution, typically the central bank and its RTGS system. There are several
reasons for this. A central bank is neutral and provides a common settlement
institution for all participants. Credit risk and reserve requirements are eliminated,
standing facilities and lender-of-last resort support are available, and the central
bank can enforce regulations/recommendations on systemically important
payment and settlement systems.
As regards retail payments, cheques are often handled separately from card
payments. Credit transfers and direct debits may also be processed in separate
systems. Domestic payments are normally processed apart from foreign payments.
Securities settlement transactions are processed in special systems, which are
often differentiated into systems for interest-bearing and equity instruments. The
result varies from country to country depending on the number of factors. In some
countries, the private sector has been eager to build payment system
infrastructure; in others, it has been a public task. Sometimes new developments
have resulted in completely new systems while in other cases old systems have
been enlarged and upgraded.
The final end-of-day settlement typically occurs in public RTGS systems.
This is especially the case for high-value payments, but private settlement
institutions are occasionally used. The settlement positions from the other systems
                                                
7 Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement
finality in payment and securities settlement systems.12
are transferred by different means from the other (ancillary) systems to the RTGS
system by the end of the day. Figure 1 describes the general structural
possibilities.








































The RTGS level is generally the highest level as most other systems eventually
settle on this level. RTGS systems can be used solely for interbank settlement or
for transportation of individual payment transactions as well.
CNS systems can be considered private RTGS systems that normally settle at
end of day in RTGS systems. However, these systems often use various kinds of
swap or liquidity injection methods to reducing their internal risk positions (which
imply interfaces with the RTGS systems). Sometimes private systems can
‘autonomously’ settle using central bank RTGS systems. In such cases, the private
system transfers central bank liquidity into a separate account held by the central
bank or the system itself on behalf of the clearing parties. All transactions are then
booked on these accounts. Examples of CNS systems with RTGS interfaces are
the international CLS, the French PNS and US-based CHIPS systems. In all these
systems liquidity is transferred into special accounts to reach full collateralisation.
Examples of partly collateralised and limit-based systems are the European Euro1
and the POPS system in Finland. Participants in these systems use intraday
liquidity swaps to free credit caps and an end-of-day settlement mechanism to
square the positions in the RTGS systems.
DNS systems are typically different types of Automated Clearing Houses
(ACH) and thereby private ancillary systems using RTGS accounts for end-of-day13
settlement. The ACH routes individual payments and calculates net positions for
end-of-day settlements.
There can also be a number of systems operating in parallel at the same level
with intersystem transaction flows. RTGS systems and securities settlement
system can have direct links with similar systems. The European TARGET
system is a good example of interacting RTGS systems.
A hierarchy of interdependent systems contains different types of
synchronisation problems. Transactions generated in one system have to be
processed in the other system. The liquidity is shared by the systems. It should be
able to flow between these systems and should be available according to the needs
of the different systems. Swap and liquidity injections can be used as methods of
liquidity transfer. Interdependence increases also contamination risks. Problems in
one system can affect the other system, for example in a crisis scenario RTGS
problems in one system can hinder processing in the international CLS system,
which affect in turn other RTGS systems.
It is possible to build many types of system hierarchies with the BoF-PSS2
simulator. The transactions sent from one system can be received by any
participant (account) in any other system in the same simulation. There can be a
large number of systems in the same simulation. Intersystem accounts are
automatically generated for maintaining the intersystem balances. Specific
features and settlement algorithms can be specified separately for each system.
The simulator can therefore contain eg TARGET-type structures with a large
number of interconnected RTGS systems. It can also contain typical domestic
structures with one RTGS system as the main system and a number of ancillary
systems processing customer payments, securities, etc.
Simulations can also be used to assess different settlement modes, eg if the
system moves from net settlement to gross settlement, or when additional
settlement cycles are introduced. Such changes are likely to have an impact on the
liquidity requirements of the participants, but also on their submission patterns of
payments to the processing. Unless the submission patterns are also simulated,
this will need to be controlled when the simulation results are assessed. The
impact on payment queues can also be studied when systems are simulated with
varying levels of liquidity available to participants.
3.2 Transaction types and interdependencies
A basic payment consists of a debit and a credit booking. A basic free-of-payment
(FOP) securities book-entry transaction consists of an asset debit and an asset
credit booking. In both cases, the systems are closed loops and the total amount of
funds on participant accounts in a system remains the same.14
Central banks and CSDs are in the position to increase the total available
balance of liquidity and assets. Other settlement institutions can also increase the
credit balances by extending more loans. From the system participants point of
view these are external transactions, but technically these are often done over
special settlement institution accounts that resemble normal participant accounts.
To ensure simultaneous and dependent deliveries, PVP, DVP, and DVD
(payment-versus-payment, delivery-versus-delivery and delivery-versus-delivery)
processes have been established. The PVP process in used when settling currency
deals, ie the two payment transactions in different currencies are processed only if
both can be made final simultaneously. The DVP process is used for settling
securities deals by requiring simultaneous settlement of the payment and asset
legs. The DVD process can be used for ensuring securities credits by making the
delivery of borrowed securities and their collateral dependent on each other. Most
countries and most securities settlement systems require DVP-based settlement to
reduce risks.
The simulator provides the possibility for PVP, DVP and DVD transfers
within an RTGS system, between different RTGS systems and within a DNS
system. PVP, DVP and DVD transactions are identified and matched based on an
explicit link code that is provided by the user for each transaction. Simulations
can be used to quantify the exposures that arise in unsynchronised settlement of
currencies or securities. Likewise, they can be used to quantify the added liquidity
requirements (or delays) when the two legs of the transactions need to be effected
simultaneously.
4 The general process of interbank settlement
4.1 Steps in payment processing
All payment and securities settlement transactions consist of a debit leg and a
credit leg. Funds are moved from one interbank settlement account to another, and
the customer liabilities are booked on customer accounts in the banks’ systems.
As a consequence of the dematerialisation of securities certificates, the transfer of
securities consists merely of debits and credits to securities accounts. However,
settlement of a security deal requires that both the ownership of the security and
the payment are transferred.
System participants perceive the system as a flow of outgoing and incoming
transactions that result in a settlement balance. The actions of one participant
affects the flow of his outgoing transactions, while the actions of other
participants and the system design affect the flow of his incoming transactions.
Consequently, there are continuous changes in settlement balances. Rules and15
requirements set by the settlement institution or agreed among the participants
thus impact settlement balance, credit availability, etc. The settlement features of
the system are generally developed to support efficient settlement of transactions.
The process within a payment and securities settlement system can be
separated into general steps or processes (also see Figure 2):
a. Submission, whereby the participant sends a new transaction for processing
to the system, possibly from an internal transaction queue.
b. Entry, whereby the system determines whether the transaction in question
can be directly booked either completely or partly (step c), queued for
deferred settlement (step d), or rejected and resubmitted later.
c. Booking, whereby transactions eligible for booking are booked on settlement
accounts as debits to senders and credits to receivers.
d. Queue entry, whereby transactions that are ineligible for booking are
transferred to the waiting queue, and where the instruction may be modified
(eg split the transaction into several smaller ones).
e. Gridlock resolution, whereby algorithms for simultaneous settlement of
multiple queued transactions are applied to identify a subset of transactions
from the queues that can be booked without breaching risk management or
other constraints set for the system. Transactions can further be netted
bilaterally or multilaterally, and for a sub-group or for all participants.
f. Queue release, whereby queued transactions are released as soon as they
become eligible for booking (eg due to added liquidity provided by incoming
transactions from other participants or liquidity injections).
g. End-of-settlement cycle, whereby the handling of transactions that will
remain ineligible for booking until the end of the settlement cycle is
determined.16












































Payment and settlement system
Payment and securities settlement systems display varying complexity. The basic
elements of submission, entry and booking steps are available in all systems,
while queuing-based functions depend on the availability of a queuing mechanism
and related sub-functions.
In the case of securities or foreign exchange settlement systems, mechanisms
for synchronising the transfer of the security and the payment, or two currencies
may additionally be present (delivery-versus-payment or payment-versus-payment
processing).
The process within the simulator follows the structure described in Figure 2.
The simulator design is modular and separate algorithms are used for the
different steps. The user can select among several algorithms for each step. The
algorithms provided as part of the software should cover the most common
settlement conventions. Users can also construct their own custom modules with
special features not covered by the provided algorithms or for testing new
solutions. The library of simulator algorithms should increase in the coming
years.
4.2 Transaction flows
The structure of the payment flows has a considerable impact on liquidity
requirements and credit positions. Most of settlement features of modern systems
have the general objective of reducing liquidity requirements or risk exposures or17
increasing settlement speed by rearranging the settlement order of the transaction
flow. Payment flows with large intraday variations generally consume more
resources than synchronised flows in both directions. Participants can smooth
flows by changing submission patterns.
Figure 3. Examples of alternative transaction processing



























Flow order 1 Flow order 2








Settlement balance profile 2 Settlement balance profile 3 Settlement balance profile 4
Figure 3 gives examples of the impacts of alternative flow orders on the liquidity
needs of a bank. All four examples share the same transaction flow, which results
in an end-of-day balance of minus 5 units. In the first example, the bank
continuously runs a deficit or zero position towards other banks (or the settlement
institution). In example 2, the bank can make its intraday position positive or at
least zero for most of the day by rearranging the outgoing transfers, eg by queuing
payments that would cause the balance of the bank to go below –5 units. Only the
final transaction creates a deficit position. In example 3, incoming payments are
delayed (for instance, due to a technical problems somewhere in the system),
while the bank in question submits its outgoing payments early in the day. Here,
the bank is subject to a large deficit throughout the day. The case 4, all
transactions are delayed to the end of the day and processed simultaneously.
8
Currently, there is a clear difference between overnight and intraday liquidity
costs. Overnight delays in delivery are more costly than intraday delivery
                                                
8 For analysis of intraday pattern of payments in Fedwire see McAndrews and Samira (2002), and
in TARGET see ECB (2003).18
differences, so participants are motivated to ensure that their anticipated and
planned overnight positions are reached. There is greater flexibility in planning
overnight positions when the bulk of transactions are processed early in the day,
so the market can choose to introduce certain market practices to be followed that
require early submission of transactions (especially small and mid-size
transactions).
Large-value transactions and ancillary system settlements consume liquidity.
To benefit from the continuous off-setting in RTGS systems, the market
participants might agree that certain transactions are submitted within a certain
time interval to help liquidity planning.
Simulations can be used to assess the impact of altered payment flows by
simply modifying the submission times of payments in the underlying data. Such
changes might be caused by policy changes in the payment system (eg differential
pricing or cost of intraday credit), altered market practices or disturbances in the
markets (eg delays in payment submission by the banks due to uncertainties in the
market or technical failures). Simulations can be used to determine the impact on
payment queues and liquidity requirements due to the altered payment flow.
Simulations can also be used to find processing timetables and patterns that
would preserve liquidity. The probable effects of new market conventions can be
studied via simulations by reformatting the transaction flows according to the new
conventions.
4.3 Controlling transaction flows
The transaction flow has a considerable impact on liquidity positions and credit
risk exposures. Settlement systems therefore often provide procedures by which
the transaction flow can be monitored and controlled with greater synchronicity of
funds received and sent to preserve liquidity.
The first control point lies within the sending participant’s internal system,
where the decision on when to submit the transaction to the central payment and
securities settlement system is made. The central system may have a pre-
submission storage to which participants’ internal systems can send instructions in
advance. The transactions can be released from the pre-submission storage based
on parameters and rules employed for this purpose, eg a submission time in the
instruction.
The most common processing order in payment systems is FIFO (= first in,
first out). FIFO is used to release payments from queues that have built up, eg in
response to a lack of liquidity. Because transactions have different urgency,
instructions are often prioritised to allow more important transactions to bypass
the FIFO order. Other queuing orders are also possible. For example, releasing19
payments in size order starting from small transactions will likely reduce the
average queuing time per transaction (although this still probably delays large
transactions). In some systems, participants may also reorder the transaction
queues according to their preferences (eg the UK’s CHAPS system).
Splitting transactions gives a possibility to use the available liquidity more
efficiently. Splitting can be done using two main conventions: by defining a
maximum transaction size according to which larger transactions are split or by
using the available liquidity in full to create a part of the current transaction that
could be settled.
Hoarding behaviour can also be found in settlement systems. Participants may
delay transactions to reduce their own liquidity needs, which in turn can cause
congestion at the end of the day if other participants also delay their transactions.
To control fair reciprocity, multilateral or bilateral sending limits can be used. If
bilateral limits are used, a participant will only release new payments to
counterparties that have released the anticipated flow of transactions.
In the simulator, transaction flows must be defined separately for each
system. Historical payment data are generally used for these transaction flows.
When the characteristics of the system are changed (eg optimisation methods are
tested) the participant behaviour will likely also change. Simulations can,
however, also model participant behaviour. The submission algorithm determines
the transaction flow to the system. The only submission algorithm currently
available submits the payments to the settlement systems in time order.
Submission algorithms that decide for each participant when and which payments
should be submitted, therefore might be worth developing to bring greater
dynamism to the model. Alternatively, rules for participant behaviour in existing
system might be studied.
For the control of transaction flows within the system, the simulator provides
queuing based on pure FIFO or FIFO with priority. The FIFO order can also be
bypassed. The user can also use user-defined fields for creating custom queuing
orders. To have an unambiguous queuing order the last sorting field is always the
transaction ID.  Splitting of transactions can be done by using a fixed maximum
transaction size or by splitting transactions according to available liquidity.
Parallel accounts can be used for introducing hoarding behaviour and keeping
liquidity on separate accounts.
4.4 Gridlock resolution features
We use the definition for gridlock presented in Bech and Soramäki (2001 and
2002), where gridlock in a settlement systems is defined as a situation where there
is insufficient liquidity to settle given transactions one by one in a specific order,20
but there is enough liquidity to settle these simultaneously by a netting procedure.
There are several algorithms for solving gridlock situations.
Splitting transactions was described as a transaction control feature, but it can
also be seen as a gridlock resolution feature. For example, if two participants have
transactions with each other queuing and one of the participants has even a small
amount of liquidity available, splitting according to available liquidity can process
part of the original payment. This liquidity inflow to the receiver of the payment
may trigger settlement of other payments.
Bilateral offsetting is a bilateral process that can solve the gridlock between
two parties by netting transactions in the waiting queue. Offsetting can take place
in different order, eg by FIFO, priority or size. Offsetting algorithms that work in
a specific order are undemanding from the computational standpoint, while an
algorithm that tries to determine the maximum transaction value to offset
irrespective of transaction order may become computationally very complex in the
case of many queued transactions which has a very large number of possible
alternatives.
Full multilateral netting is a very simple case to solve, ie all transactions in the
queue from all participants are netted and the net balance is booked on the
settlement account. However, if there is a lack of liquidity to cover the negative
balances of participants, the entire multilateral netting has to be discarded and
possible partial multilateral netting attempted instead.
Partial multilateral netting means that some transactions or participants are
removed from the netting procedure to identify a subset of transactions that can be
settled in accordance with the system’s risk management rules and other rules. As
in bilateral offsetting, removing transactions can be done in a given queue order,
which makes the computational task easier. Transactions are removed one by one
from the queues of participants that lack liquidity until a solution is found that
satisfies the liquidity constraints. In the case of many participants and long
queues, it is a computationally non-trivial task to find an efficient algorithm to
solve the problem without a queue order constraint. One possibility to improve the
netting rate might be to try out a number of partial netting solutions with different
queue orders in succession eg FIFO first and then size order.
9
The need for and effects of gridlock resolution depend on the available
liquidity and the urgency of settlement. There are hardly ever transactions in
queues when participants have ample liquidity. Hence, there gridlock situations
are rare and there is little need for gridlock resolution algorithms. Netting always
requires the payments to stay in the queues for a while to let material for netting
pile up. When all transactions are so urgent that they cannot be allowed to queue,
                                                
9 See Günzter, Jungnickel and Leclerc (1998) and Ganz, Günzter and Jungnickel (1998) for a
discussion on partial netting algorithms for payments and securities settlement respectively.21
participants have no other option than to ensure sufficient liquidity for immediate
settlement.
Figure 4. Examples of the impact of liquidity distribution
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Liquidity distribution 2:
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Deadlock, resolvable only by adding liquidity to Bank C  
Figure 4 shows three typical situations. In the first example, the situation can be
resolved by Bank A paying Bank B, which is paying Bank C, which in turn is
paying Bank A. Here, Bank A has so much liquidity that it can start the circular
process. In the second example, a typical gridlock situation, no bank has enough
liquidity to make a payment by itself, but when incoming and outgoing payments
are netted and the available liquidity is used, the payments can be settled. In the
last example, a deadlock, Bank C has no way to make its payment because the22
liquidity from the incoming payment is still insufficient to cover the outgoing
payment. This, in turn, makes it impossible for A to make its payment and B to
make its payment.
The simulator contains a full multilateral netting algorithm and a partial
netting algorithm as described in Bech and Soramäki (2001). For the partial
netting algorithms, different types of queue orders can be defined. The output
tables contain detailed statistics on every netting session.
Simulations can be used to test and compare the various optimisation
methods. They can be helpful in selecting the best gridlock resolution, splitting, or
bilateral offsetting algorithm for the system and in assessing its effects in terms of
reduced liquidity requirements and delays in payments. Such simulations can not
only be performed to see the impact at a day-to-day level, but also to assess how
such features can remedy abnormal situations such as delays caused by market
uncertainty or the effects of participant being unable to fulfil their obligations in
the system.
Simulations can be used to quantify the need for any overnight funding or the
value and number of transactions that remain unsettled (eg in the event of a
participant failure) if funding is not available. It can also be used to test the
effectiveness of various gridlock resolution algorithms in their ability to clear
queues at the end of the day.
4.5 The need for liquidity
Payment processing requires liquidity, ie assets to pay for interbank claims arising
from payment transfers. One form of liquidity is the possibility to have negative
positions ie credit limits, whereby the settlement institution grants the necessary
credit. This, of course, creates credit risks. Much attention has been put on
reducing credit risks in payment and settlement systems. Most systems have
currently strict limits on intraday credits. Participants can only have negative
positions on the settlement account (towards the system or towards the settlement
institution) up to a given limit, which is decided based on credit risk evaluations.
When the central bank is the settlement institution, banks are often allowed to use
the reserve deposits at the central bank as settlement assets.
Participants requesting for intraday credit often have to put up collateral to
secure their limits. These limits can be fully or partly collateralised. Some private
systems demand full collateralisation in central bank money and a squaring of
accounts when the end-of-day settlement is performed. Some systems such as the
US Fedwire charge for intraday overdrafts instead of requiring collateralisation of
the positions.23
If processing stops when limits are reached, some systems employ liquidity
injections or swaps to free the limits. Liquidity can be transferred from another
system or another account to the account with insufficient liquidity. Sometimes
injections are automated, eg between TBF, the French RTGS system and RGV
(Euroclear France), the securities settlement system.
10
To preserve liquidity and/or limit counterparty risk, bilateral limits or filters
can be used to reduce the outflow of liquidity. Such a system prioritises payments
towards participants depending on the flow in the opposite direction. Maintaining
bilateral limits in a system with a large number of participants creates some
overhead (the general dimension of the table would be N*(N–1) individual limits).
Figure 5. Lower and upper bound of liquidity


















There must be sufficient liquidity in the system to process payments. If every
participant has enough funds to settle all transactions when submitted, the
liquidity available is at or above upper bound (point 1). The upper bound is
defined as the liquidity amount above which any additional liquidity will remain
unused. When some or all participants have less liquidity than the upper bound,
payments cannot be settled immediately and must be delayed. Where this is done
by an automatic queuing facility, the trade-off in terms of liquidity and delay is a
                                                
10 See ECB (2001).24
convex curve as shown in the figure above
11. The more liquidity is reduced, the
longer the delays. This is explained by the increase of gridlocks and deadlocks in
the system when liquidity is reduced
12.
The minimum amount of liquidity required to settle all payments submitted
during a day is called the lower bound of liquidity. The lower bound of liquidity
equals the net amount of incoming and outgoing payments for a bank, or zero if
the inflow of funds is higher than the outflow. If all participants in the system
have this amount of liquidity available, the system is at point 2 in the figure for
end-of day net settlement systems or at point 3 for RTGS systems with an
automatic queuing facility. In an end-of-day settlement system, the liquidity usage
is minimised and the delay is maximised. In an RTGS system with an automatic
queuing facility, the relationship between liquidity needs and delays can be
improved, and thus the payment delays for point 3 are significantly lower than for
point 2. The RTGS system is, however, very likely to be gridlocked at the end of
the day with some payments remaining unsettled if gridlock resolution is not
applied.
In case one or more participants have less than the lower bound of liquidity,
some payments will necessarily remain unsettled. When liquidity is reduced to
zero (point 4), all payments are delayed until the end of the day and remain
unsettled unless participants have offsetting positions that can be settled by a
partial net settlement algorithm.
The upper bound of liquidity for a system can be determined in the simulator
by making a RTGS simulation in which all participants have been granted
unrestricted intraday credit. The resulting minimum balances will be the upper
bound of liquidity required for immediate processing without queuing.  The end-
of-day balances in this simulation will be the lower bound of liquidity provided
that a netting procedure is applied in the end of the day.
4.6 System configuration elements
The features and decision parameters of a particular system configuration can be
categorised as follows:
1. Processing and settlement mode (eg real-time or deferred, bilateral or
multilateral and gross, hybrid and net settlement).
2. Connections or relationships to other systems (eg ancillary system interfaces).
3. Limits on accounts and net positions.
                                                
11 For a more detailed discussion on the trade-off curve, see Koponen and Soramäki (1998) and
Leinonen and Soramäki (1999).
12 See Bech and Soramäki (2001).25
4. Transaction control features (eg prioritising, queuing, reordering and
splitting).
5. Gridlock resolution (eg bilateral off-setting, partial netting and multilateral
netting).
6. DVD or PVP support.
7. End-of-day procedures (eg processing of non-settled transactions).
8. Tariff and pricing parameters (eg transaction pricing, fixed tariffs, intraday
interest rate and delay costs).
In addition to features described in earlier chapters, end-of-day procedures are
important to system participants. At the end of the day or the end of a settlement
cycle, some transactions may remain in the waiting queues that cannot be settled
with the available liquidity. In such cases, there are three options available:
discard them, transfer them to the next day or grant/inject additional liquidity to
make processing possible. In some cases, the open hours of the system may be
extended to give participants or service providers more time to solve the situation
by getting more liquidity, submit missing transactions, etc.
In a net settlement system, the lack of liquidity or a credit limit restriction
may lead to postponement of the entire net settlement session or implementation
of some sort of partial netting algorithm, which can imply unwinding of some of
the transaction flow. This, in turn, has implications on the finality of transfers.
In order to cover costs, the services of payment systems generally priced
according to a mix of transaction-based, fixed and start-up tariffs. The settlement
service provider can affect the behaviour of participants and choice of system. For
example, if transaction tariffs are high, bunching and the use of alternative routes
become issues. High fixed tariffs can motivate smaller banks to pool their
resources and cooperate to share fixed costs. These cost elements affect the
settlement system structure and market shares over the long run.
Service providers can also price the usage of credit. If credit is needed and it
is costly then participants have an interest to delay payments to avoid negative
balances for as long as possible. This, however, results in end-of-day congestion
when there are no processing rules or customer agreements stipulating faster
transfers. To avoid congestion at certain moments or time intervals, the service
provider may apply a time-dependent tariff policy.
The simulation technique gives a good possibility to test the effects of changes
to the system parameters and see what impact they might have on liquidity needs
of participants, cost components, processing speed, etc.26
5 The costs of settlement
Existing payment and securities settlement systems involve varying transaction
costs depending on the efficiency of the software and hardware systems, and
available economies of scale. Modern technologies are usually more efficient than
old solutions (eg current server hardware outperforms old mainframes). Reduction
of manual routines and increased automation also play an important role in
reducing operational costs. Operational costs, however, tend to be a minor part of
the total costs of payment and securities settlement system structures. Moreover,
operational costs tend to be very similar for different system structures as long as
the systems employ efficient technology and are efficiently organised. The
interesting cost elements, therefore, are those dependent on the configuration of
the payment and securities settlement system, ie
a. the cost of liquidity,
b. the cost of financial risks, and
c. the costs of delayed transactions.
These cost parameters determine which kind of system design will minimise
overall costs and have an impact on how the participants will submit transactions
and at what speed they will be processed in the system. All three types of costs are
interrelated and can be traded off against each other by choosing different system
designs.
A main determinant of the above costs is the settlement asset or media used in
the system. This can take the following form in a funds transfer system:
(i) deposits with the settlement institution,
(ii) credit from the settlement institution, or
(iii)credits/deposits with other participants.
In the first case, transactions in the system can only be made if enough deposits
are available to fund the transaction. In the second alternative, transactions in the
system can only be made if the credit lines agreed with the settlement institution
facilitate the transfer. In the third option, transactions can be made as long as the
credit lines agreed bilaterally with other members of the system are not exceeded.
Naturally, a system can use a combination of these options or operate without
restrictions on the credits/deposits allowed.
The cost of the settlement media depends on its alternative investment
possibilities. For instance, the cost of liquidity is close to zero in the case of
mandatory reserve requirements without alternative investment possibilities. For
intraday credits requiring first-class collateral, the costs could be seen as the27
losses made on keeping low-risk and low-return assets compared to investments
with higher yields. In case of overdrafts with credit risk, there is a need to
calculate the costs of taking these credit risks.
In the following sections, we discuss the costs of liquidity, financial risks and
delayed transactions associated with the three options for the settlement asset.
5.1 Cost of liquidity
Liquidity, in conjunction with payment and securities settlement systems, can be
understood as the ability to fulfil ones obligations at a reasonable cost. Liquid
assets are assets or claims on other assets that are generally accepted as payment
(or assets that can easily be converted into such). Sight deposits, either at the
central bank or at commercial banks, are normally the most liquid asset form.
A division is generally made between intraday and overnight liquidity. The
division stems from the fact that interest is calculated on the basis of value dates
rather than continuously. The cost of both intraday liquidity and overnight
liquidity is determined by the central bank. EU central banks currently provide
intraday liquidity free of charge, while eg the Federal Reserve charges
approximately 0.36% for it
13. Both intraday and overnight credit must be
collateralised, which carries an additional cost.
If the system operates on deposits, the cost of intraday liquidity is the
opportunity cost of income that would be received by investing the funds held on
settlement accounts in assets of equal risk. Such liquidity costs can be close to
zero when eg ample central bank required reserves that otherwise would be idle
can be used for settlement purposes. To increase deposits at the settlement
institution, participants can borrow funds from each other. While an intraday
market could give a market price for intraday funds, no intraday market has yet
evolved (probably because intraday liquidity is provided free of interest or at a
very low cost by central banks).
14
If the system operates on credit from the settlement institution, the liquidity
costs depend on the remuneration and collateralisation required by the settlement
institution. While the remuneration cost is direct, collateralisation requirements
also pose opportunity costs for the assets pledged as collateral. The laws of supply
and demand govern the opportunity costs of collateral. The costs are increased if
the list of collateral accepted is short (short supply), and if there are plenty of
opportunities to use the collateral to make generate profits (eg securities lending)
                                                
13 Federal Reserve Policy Statement on Payments System Risk, January 4, 1999.
14 For a discussion on the link between intraday and overnight credit, see Rossi (1995) and Dale
and Rossi (1996). For analysis on intraday credit policies by the central bank see Humphrey (1990
and 1996), Furfine and Stehm (1997) and Kahn and Roberds (1998b).28
or if they are needed elsewhere (increased demand). Further costs of
collateralisation may arise if banks may be forced to hold inferior portfolios
compared to those that would result from free choice. Moreover, if the list of
securities eligible as collateral is short, those on the list may generate lower
returns due to their increased liquidity.
If the system operates exclusively on uncollateralised debt relations between
the participants, the liquidity costs are zero.
The availability of liquidity can vary, which means the cost of liquidity can
also vary. Liquidity costs may also vary by seasonally and as the result of general
market conditions. Liquidity may become scarce at the end of the day, in the end
of the reserve maintenance period or due to special circumstances, when
everybody starts to hoard liquidity.
5.2 Cost of financial risks
The two main financial risks in payment and securities settlement systems are
credit risk and liquidity risk. Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty will never
settle an obligation for full value. The party expecting to receive the funds makes
up the loss to the principal amount of the transaction.
Liquidity risk can be understood two ways. First, it can be understood from
the receiving institution’s perspective as the risk that its counterparty fails to settle
its obligation for full value when due, but does settle eventually. Second, it can be
understood from the paying institution’s perspective as the risk associated with
difficulties in finding the required liquidity at economic terms.
5.2.1 Credit risk
In case the system operates on deposits at the settlement institution, a participant
of the system faces the risk that the settlement institution fails while it has a claim
on it.
If the system operates on credit lines from the settlement institution, the
situation is reversed, ie the settlement institution faces the risk that the participant
fails while it is in a credit position vis-à-vis the settlement institution. Central
banks and other settlement institutions can be exposed to considerable credit risks
depending on their credit and collateral policies. The costs of interbank credit
risks perceived by banks also depend on official policies towards banks in crises.
Currently, most payment and securities settlement systems have internal features
limiting maximum credit risks as recommended by the Lamfalussy standards and29
subsequently the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems
and Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems
15.
In theory, a system based on credit from the settlement institution could run
continuously without periodic settlement of the resulting positions with other
claims. Generally, however, systems based on credit from the settlement
institution contain a final end-of-day/end-of-settlement-cycle settlement of the
credit positions in some safer claim such as central bank money. Many systems
have settlement and clearing institutions that can partly take up credit exposures
or control collateral or settlement asset accounting.
If, on the other hand, the system is based on interbank debt relations, the
receiving bank has to accept increased liabilities for each transfer received. The
liability depends on the transaction finality point towards the customer and
towards the other bank.
The interbank liabilities can be distributed among the participants through a
loss-sharing agreement. Overall limits can be used to keep the overall credit risks
within acceptable magnitudes. The credit risks can still vary greatly during the
system open hours for individual participants. A loss-sharing agreement can be
used for evening out random peaks closer to average positions. A loss-sharing
agreement can be seen as a joint insurance scheme, where everybody takes part in
covering the losses using predefined distribution keys.
The payment and securities settlement systems can also be based on a
combination of liquidity transfers and credit caps. For instance, a liquidity transfer
may be required when the upper limit of the credit cap is reached. An example of




In systems that operate on the basis of deposits with (or credit from) the
settlement institution, liquidity risks can arise if the participant runs out of funds
and is unable to settle transactions as planned. Liquidity risk is therefore closely
related to the costs of payment delays and the cost of liquidity. In such a situation,
the bank faces the choice of delaying payment until it receives sufficient funds to
settle or it can acquire the funds from the settlement institution or the market.
There is a further dimension creating liquidity risk that stems from the
incentives of system participants to free-ride on the liquidity of other participants.
The treasurer of a bank would wish to receive payments early and send them late
in order to save liquidity. However, a delay in settlement reduces the sender’s
                                                
15 See BIS (2001) and BIS/IOSCO (2001a, 2001b and 2002) respectively.
16 See ECB (2001).30
liquidity costs but increases both its delay costs and the receiver’s liquidity costs
as it needs to finance its outgoing payments using other means. This creates a
dead-weight loss at system level. In an extreme situation the system might end up
in a situation where the number of payments submitted is strongly reduced as the
participants each await liquidity from others.
17
5.2.3 Settlement risk
Settlement risk is a type of credit risk independent of the settlement asset used.
Settlement risk in securities and foreign exchange settlement is generally defined
as the risk that one party to a transaction will provide the asset it sold but not
receive the asset it bought. Settlement risk has both a credit risk and a liquidity
risk dimension.
Settlement risk can arise in payment systems if the receiving bank credits the
funds on the customer accounts in anticipation of receiving the funds from the
sending bank. If the sending bank goes bankrupt, the credit risk is borne by the
receiving bank. Such settlement risks can arise in systems with any of the three
settlement assets.
In securities and foreign exchange trading, the party that has first made the
payment for one leg of the transaction faces the possibility that its counterparty
may not deliver the other asset when due. If the happens, it must finance the
shortfall until the counterparty honours its obligation (liquidity risk). The party
paying first also faces a risk that the counterparty may fail to complete the second
leg of the transaction. Thus, it is exposed to liability for the full amount of the
transaction (credit risk).
Settlement risk can also arise from legal uncertainty (eg a situation where it is
unclear if the rules of netting will be accepted by the courts).
5.2.4 Systemic risk
In the context of payment and securities settlement systems, systemic risk refers
to the risk that the failure of one participant in a system to meet its required
obligations causes other participants to be unable to meet their obligations when
                                                
17 On bank incentives in payment systems see Kahn and Roberds (1998a). A game theoretical
model on bank behaviour under different credit policies of the central bank has been developed in
Bech and Garrat (2003). On a discussion on the deadweight losses and other externalities in
payment systems see Schoenmaker (1993) and Angelini (1998). For a model on total costs
(liquidity and risk) in net and gross systems, see Schoenmaker (1995).31
due. Notably, similar systemic risks can be caused by the failure of the settlement
institution itself.
18
The cost of a systemic disturbance can be high. The chain reaction may
expand into an overall systemic crisis and can jeopardise the operation of the
entire financial system and ultimately the real economy. Central banks have been
concerned of limiting systemic risk, eg by issuing the Core Principles for
Systemically Important Payment Systems
19.
Because of efforts to reduce risks in interbank payment system, the likelihood
of a chain reaction caused by exposures in these systems seems currently to be
relatively low. This at least is the outcome of studies for Finnish, Danish and
Canadian interbank payment systems
20. Blåvarg and Nimander (2002) find similar
results for payment system exposures in Sweden, but point out that the systemic
risk comes mainly from foreign exchange exposures. The introduction of CLS
reduced globally systemic risks stemming from foreign exchange settlement
substantially.
5.3 Costs of delayed payments
The speed of transaction settlement and processing is a critical element in
settlement system costs. If payments could be postponed without costs, nobody
would have an interest in settlement or in providing liquidity. The delay costs are
generally determined based on a given time limit. Exceeding the time limit
implies such high costs that, in most cases, parties have incentive to avoid
exceeding the time limit. These costs may be explicit fines for delays, but it is
often intangible values that make up delay costs (eg expected service quality).
Because there is generally no special gain in paying/settling too early, transactions
are often transmitted close to the time limit. This is especially the case in systems
where settlement funds are costly. In systems with idle and low-cost settlement
assets, continuous transaction flows are often preferred to avoid operational
congestion. Interbank payment and securities settlement systems in the past have
generally showed day-based timetables in the form of T+1, T+2 or even T+5
settlement. The speed is currently improving with more true real-time based
systems and batch systems processing with many settlement cycles during the
same day. The priority/importance of the transaction also affects the desired
                                                
18 For general studies on systemic risk stemming from netting systems see BIS (1989),
McAndrews and Wasilyew (1995), Angelini, Maresca and Russo (1996), Borio and Van den
Bergh (1993). For a comparison on gross and net settlement systems see Freixas and Parigi (1998).
For a survey on different concepts of systemic risk see de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
19 See BIS (2001).
20 See Kuussaari (1996), Bech, Madsen and Natorp (2002) and Northcott (2002) respectively.32
processing speed. Additional liquidity costs are acceptable for urgent payments,
while the processing of less urgent transactions can be postponed to later. The
trend towards enhanced speed increases also the share of immediately settled and
processed transactions.
5.4 Combined costs
Liquidity requirements, financial risks and payment delays both mirror the
transaction flow, but from opposite angles.
By choosing payment and securities settlement system structures and
processing features, system participants/providers can attempt to identify the
optimal point as a balance between the three main objective variables as depicted
in Figure 6.









Generally, the system structure is more efficient when it is closer to origin.
Different participants may have different utility functions and different views on
the relative weights of the variables. In general, increasing liquidity consumption,
credit risk exposure, or both, can increase settlement speed. Different methods for
smoothing and ordering payment flows, gridlock resolution and netting algorithms
can be used for reducing liquidity consumption and/or credit risk exposure with a
moderate amount of increased settlement delay. Liquidity consumption and credit
risks exposures can be fixed if the transaction flows have to be settled at once
when transactions are submitted without a possibility to affect the flow and depart33
from the FIFO processing order. When transactions can be rearranged and a
certain amount of delay is allowed, the transaction flow can be smoothed and
thereby reduce liquidity or credit risk variations. The objective of netting,
splitting, reordering by prioritising features is to smooth transaction flows.
Payment and settlement systems contain varying degrees of risk. Simulations
can be used to ascertain risk information unavailable in current system statistics.
For example, intraday exposures by individual participants and/or the entire
system can be studied. The systemic impacts of failures of large participants in the
system can be evaluated and the consequences of large breakdowns examined. In
complex environments, it is particularly difficult to foresee all the consequences
without simulating possible situations.34
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Appendix 1
An overview of the BoF-PSS2 payment and settlement
system simulator
Background
In the mid-1990s, a payment system simulator was developed within Bank of
Finland. It was found to be a valuable tool for studying the probable effects of the
introduction of EMU on Finnish payment systems. Some other countries also used
this first BoF simulator for other types of analysis such as queuing and algorithm
studies, and clarification of risk and liquidity issues. Due to its popularity, a more
efficient user-friendly and comprehensive version was built in 2003. BoF-PSS2 is
now available for research purposes at no charge and with complete
documentation.
Basic features of the simulator
BoF-PSS2 is intended for independent use by payment and settlement systems
designers, administrators, analysts at central banks and financial institutions,
research institutions and academics. The simulation software is downloaded to the
user’s computing environment (typically a PC) for local processing. The
download includes user documentation. The Bank of Finland will arrange, from
time to time, simulation seminars and will provide limited start-up support. User
support, if needed, is available from a software company. This support is priced
according to this company’s normal pricing policy.
The BoF-PSS2 simulator is a tool for making a variety of payment system
analyses. The basic principle is that given payment flows are processed in a given
model of an existing or contemplated payment and settlement system structure.
The simulator thus models settlement processes for a specified payment system
environment. The simulation results are account bookings and account balances
made according to the rules defined for the payment system environment. The
transaction processing output can then be analysed with an included analyser tool
or exported into other programs such as Excel. Typical areas of interest include
intersystem credit risk, liquidity consumption and risks, settlement speed, gridlock
resolution and settlement efficiency.
The simulation process starts with the creation of the payment or transaction
flow(s) to be processed and defining of the payment/settlement system
environment and rules (eg systems, participants, limits and settlement rules). Next
the simulation is run. The results are then compared against other simulation runs40
or real-life observations. Using the simulation tool is essentially an iterative
learning process, ie earlier simulation runs become the basis for improving and
refining subsequent simulation runs. Thus, the simulator is not a deterministic
econometric optimisation model, but rather a heuristic tool for analysing systems
that are too complex for deterministic models. The BoF-PSS2 can process in one
simulation several million transactions to be booked on several thousand accounts
in several interlinked systems. In other words, optimisation analysis is mainly
done via a ‘trial-and-error’ or enumeration process. The simulation runs are
repeated for different values on the decision-making parameters and the resulting
objective values are compared for the different combinations. For instance, a
central bank might want to determine the bank-specific minimum liquidity
required for guaranteeing that in 99.5% of all cases continuous settlement during
the day is maintained so that transactions are not queued for longer than ten
minutes. To find the answer, the bank would model various levels of liquidity to
see which levels fulfil the objective. The model is thus a workbench for testing
alternatives.
The simulator’s basic features are:
1. Input data import and export tool. All input data must be presented in
comma-separated values (CSV) format. The importer supports free ordering
of the data fields and ensures that the imported data are formatted correctly.
Basic data validations are done and key fields are matched against each other.
For example, participant keys in transaction data must match those for
participant (account) data.
2. Transaction submission algorithms determine which transactions are
submitted to the system and when they are submitted. The submission
algorithm can be used to introduce rule-based user behaviour into a model (eg
early submission of large volumes of low-priority payments only allowed for
participants from which reciprocal payments have been received).
3. Transaction processing algorithms for simulating real-time gross settlement
systems (RTGS) with gridlock resolution and other optimisation features,
deferred net settlement systems (DNS) and continuous net settlement systems
(CNS).
4. Linking of different systems, ie payments debited from one system can be
credited to an account in another system, or settlement totals as calculated in
an ancillary system can be settled in another system. The first option gives the
possibility to simulate a network of interlinked systems (eg TARGET links
together 16 different RTGS systems). The second option gives the user the41
possibility to model payment structures consisting of main and ancillary
systems.
5. Handling of multiple accounts per participant and multiple currencies in
each system can be simulated, as well as simulation of multi-currency and
securities settlement systems. In the simulator settlement of each transaction
results in book entries on accounts. There is no difference in the basic process
with respect to currency or securities type. The meaningfulness of transactions
must thus be ensured in the payment data (eg so that a debit is not made to an
EUR account when the corresponding credit goes to a GBP account).
6. Settling two-leg transactions where settlement of one leg is conditional upon
the settlement of the other leg. This enables simulations of payment-versus-
payment (PVP) in foreign exchange settlement and delivery-versus-payment
(DVP) systems in securities settlement.
7. Output exporter and analyser for a given set of basic statistical parameters
and an output exporter for transferring the results to external analysis
programs (eg Excel) for detailed analysis.
BoF-PSS2 contains basic submission and transaction processing
algorithms adequate for most common simulation needs. The model also
allows for user customisation via external algorithm interfaces. Users or third
parties can program additional algorithms to incorporate in the simulator.
Custom algorithms may be submitted to the BoF-PSS2 general library, from
where they can be retrieved by other users.
The main difference between the simulator and an actual payment system is that
the time function is event-driven and not real time. Processing is performed
transaction by transaction. The simulator operates generally faster than the real
world, but processing speed depends on the volumes, processing complexity and
available processing capacity. In RTGS test cases, the simulator has processed
and booked about two million transactions in one hour. In any case, the end result
is the same as if the simulator had run in real time.
Simulations can be carried out for separate days or for sequences of days. In
the later case, closing balances and unsettled transactions can be carried over to
the next day or next settlement occasion/period. The simulator uses the standard
calendar and assumes all days (even weekends) are banking days. However, if
there are no transactions for a given day the account balances will remain stable
until payment flows are detected on a subsequent banking day.
For the sake of manageability, each feature has been implemented in a
standardised way (in real systems, features can be implemented in many ways).
Thus, the user must transform the input data according to the convention used in42
the simulator (eg DVP and PVP transactions are matched based on a given
individual code field and a code has to be given by the user for such transactions
if the matching is performed using other conventions). BoF-PSS2 is limited purely
to payment and transaction processing and the pledge type of collateral aspects of
payment systems are not explicitly included. However, repo-type of collateral
processing could be included through DVP repo transactions, especially if the
simulation in question contains a securities settlement system. Both repo- and
pool-based collateral requirements and processes might also be introduced into the
simulator by defining special collateral systems, which would store the collateral
balances and would have DVP links with the RTGS system(s).
System structure
The BoF-PSS2 system structure consists of three main subsystems:
a) Input Generation Subsystem,
b) Simulation Execution Subsystem, and
c) Output Processing Subsystem.
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The Input Generation Subsystem contains tools for importing and validating
transaction data, participant data, as well as data on daily account balances and
credit limits All data are stored in database files. The importer checks that the43
input data are formally valid and transfers them into system database structures.
The correctness of the input data is vital. Account numbers in the transaction file
must correspond with those in the participant (account) data. While all data must
be presented in CSV format, it can be entered in any user-defined order. The user
defines templates to describe the CSV files and match the input files with the
database structure. Data in the database can also be edited by exporting them as
CSV files into eg Excel and then importing them after the changes are made. The
simulator does not include a proprietary editor for this purpose.
The Simulation Execution Subsystem includes tools for configuring and
running simulations. It also contains the actual simulation and settlement logic.
This subsystem keeps a log of all events and bookings and makes reports and
statistics on the simulation runs. A configurator/executor tool facilitates
configuring and execution of simulation runs.
The Output Processing Subsystem includes the functionality for reporting
basic statistics on the most common result parameters. The output database
contains the raw data of the booking order of the transactions and the balances on
the settlement accounts. The input database contains the transaction flow, while
the output database contains the settlement flow (the settlement order and timing
of the submitted transactions). The analyser tool is used for generating additional
reports and transferring selected statistics to CSV files for later use. Users
typically perform many simulations and then compare the results. The analyser
tool provides some basic reports and comparison possibilities, but advanced
analyses need to be made by exporting CSV files into eg Excel for further
analysis. Before running a simulation, it is advisable to create a structure for the
simulation runs and determine how the results will be stored in databases for
further analysis. Databases can be overwhelmed when transaction volumes are
very high and all transaction level events are retained in the databases.
Input data
System data defines the systems in the simulation. A large number of systems,
each with individual properties, can be included. For example, many RTGS, CNS
and DNS systems can run in parallel in the same simulation. There are no specific
limitations for the number of systems. The system data contains the information
on the features implemented in these systems (eg queuing method, end-of-day
conventions, netting algorithms used, open hours and net settlement timing).
System-level input data are defined, due to their complexity, through a separate
input screen and not through the CSV format as used for the other input data
tables.
Participant (account) data contains information about the participants
(accounts) in each simulated system.44
Balance data contains the daily initial account balances for each account in
the systems. Another way to introduce initial balances is through payments from
central bank accounts to the participants’ accounts. When simulations for a
sequence of days are performed, end-of-day balances for the previous day can be
carried forward to the next day or defined separately for each day.
Intraday credit limit data contains information about the intraday credit
limit of the accounts and changes to them during the day. In simulations with a
sequence of days, credit limit changes remain in force until the next change.
Transaction data includes all information about individual transactions.
Such transactions can be payments or transfers of securities, and their properties
include the value of the transaction, sender and sending account, and receiver and
receiving account. Five user-defined fields in transaction data can be used to carry
information that can be used in user-defined submission and transaction
processing algorithms (eg priority codes).
Output data
Simulation results are written to an output database organised by levels
(simulation, system, participant and event levels).
The simulation level contains the general data of the simulation, eg date and
time, input database and a description given by the user.
The system level contains the overall statistics for each system and
transaction and account totals.
The participant level gives totals and averages for each participant (account).
These can be used to check the impact of simulated ‘what if’ scenarios on
individual participants or participant groups.
The event level data make up the main bulk of the output database. It is a
transaction level log of everything the simulator processed. Submission, booking
and queuing events are reported separately. Gridlock resolution events or
violation events (eg overdraw limits) are reported separately. User-defined
modules can also write comment events for later analysis. To limit the output
data, the user can select data to be retained or reported for each simulation run.
There are ready-made basic statistics reports on system and participant
(account) level. There is also a basic reporting tool for comparing simulations.
Because the output data are so vast and users have such diverse needs, a general
output exporter has been created. The user can select interesting output data and
export them as CSV files for additional analysis in Excel and other applications
that support CSV files. The user defines templates to describe the output CSV
files and selection criteria to select the data content.45
Overview of settlement capabilities
The simulator identifies three general types of systems: RTGS (real-time gross
settlement), CNS (continuous net settlement), and DNS (deferred net settlement
systems). Table 1 provides an overview of the current features available for
various systems. The palette will likely expand as users and Bank of Finland
create new modules.
Table 1. Current available settlement palette
RTGS CNS DNS
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Transfers to next day Queued payments and
balances
Queued payments Queued payments
Liquidity injections Given amount or as %
of limit
Given amount or as %
of limit





The user has the possibility to introduce user-defined modules that contain eg
settlement conventions that are not currently supplied as ready-made algorithms.
Hardware and system requirements
The simulator software is distributed online and contains an automated installation
package.
The minimum hardware requirements are a PC with an Intel Pentium 4 class
processor and at least 256 MB of RAM (main memory). For large simulations, at
least 512 MB of RAM is recommended.
The system can be installed and run on Windows NT/2000 or Windows XP.
Although untested, it should work with modifications on Linux operating systems
with a compliant installation of Sun Microsystem’s Java Runtime Environment
(JRE) version 1.3.46
The simulator requires installation of the MySQL database. It is also
recommended that Microsoft Excel is available.
Availability, ordering and further information
Further information (PowerPoint presentations, user manual, installation guide,
database descriptions, etc.) on the simulator can be found at www.bof.fi/sc/bof-
pss.
A beta version is currently available. The first generally available version will
be released in early 2004. The simulator can be ordered by sending a fax to the
Bank of Finland as described on the web page.47
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